involves a long sea journey, and locks up shipping for considerable periods. Moreover, every increase of the Army means an increase in the amount of shipping committed, for maintenance purposes, to this long and dangerous line of communications. The increased intensity of the enemy's submarine campaign makes this line of communication dangerous throughout its length. For these reasons we are most unwilling to send any further force to Salonika, at a time when our Allies are making ever-increasing demands on our shipping resources for their essential needs in raw materials, coal, food supplies, and munitions. So serious is the shipping position, so vital a factor is it upon the staying power of the Entente, that we will return to this question later as a separate subject. In the meanwhile, we must ask the Conference to accept our view that after exhaustive examination we have come to the conclusion that the grave shipping situation provides an overwhelming argument against the dispatch of further British divisions to Salonika. "

[The chapter on shipping reveals the precarious position we were in at that time. Our measures to deal with the situation had been barely launched. But it is necessary to point out that these difficulties with regard to the supply of shipping had not arisen in an acute form in 1915. Therefore we

could then have dispatched to Salonika, and maintained there a sufficient force to prevent the Serbian defeat and the overrunning of the Balkan Peninsula by the Central Powers.]

The next six paragraphs of my memorandum, numbered 17 to 22, urged that Italy should send additional reinforcements to Salonika, and in this